Governments and companies are engaged in a battle to determine who can do what on the internet, and the outcome will reverberate around the world.政府和企业于是以投放一场关于谁可以在互联网上做到什么的战斗，其结局将在全球引起反响。Google’s troubles in Europe over privacy, antitrust and the “right to be forgotten” are one example of this struggle. Multinational companies’ tussles with the US National Security Agency and Britain’s GCHQ over access to user data are another.在欧洲，谷歌(Google)在隐私、反垄断和“被消逝权”(Right to be Forgotten)领域遭遇的困难，就是这场斗争的一个例子。跨国公司与美国国家安全局(NSA)和英国政府通信总部(GCHQ)环绕用户数据采访权的角力是另一个例子。

At the same time some democracies and companies are working together against a coalition that includes most of the world’s authoritarian regimes in a struggle over how the internet should be governed, by whom, and to what extent states should be able to replicate physical borders in cyberspace. The outcomes of these clashes will affect everybody who uses the internet, determining whether it remains free and open as intended or whether we are left with a cyber space that is “Balkanised” and fragmented.与此同时，一些民主国家和企业于是以牵头赞成一个还包括全球大多数威权政权的联盟，中心问题是如何监管互联网、由谁监管，以及政府可在何种程度上在网络空间拷贝实体世界。这些冲突的结局将影响所有用于互联网的人，要求互联网否将按照各方的想法，维持权利和对外开放？抑或我们将面临一个“巴尔干化”、四分五裂的网络空间？There are many reasons to work for an open, interconnected internet. It eases cross-border commerce and education, maximising economic opportunities. It enables otherwise isolated political, religious and sexual minorities to forge global alliances. The aftermath of the Arab uprisings has proved that unfettered internet access does not magically produce prosperity and pluralism – yet in the 21st century it is a precondition for spreading economic and political rights.致力于一个对外开放且互联互通的互联网有很多理由。

它将增进跨境商业和教育，最大化经济机遇。它使孤立无援的政治、宗教和性取向少数群体需要创建全球联盟。

阿拉伯暴乱的余波证明，不受约束的网际网路并会奇迹般地可谓兴旺和多元化，然而在21世纪，它是拓展经济和政治权利的前提条件。Democracies and multinationals (with Google vocally in the lead) have appointed themselves champions of a “free and open” internet, despite a widening trust deficit with the public exacerbated by the revelations of Edward Snowden, the former NSA contractor turned whistleblower. They are working with experts and activists from around the world to promote what they call a “multi-stakeholder model” of internet governance and policy making. Here, business and “civil society” groups take a seat at the table on equal terms with governments to make decisions about the future of the internet.民主国家和跨国企业（谷歌态度独特地领头）自称为“权利且对外开放”互联网的倡导者，尽管美国国安局前合同工爱德华斯诺登(Edward Snowden)的爆料激化了日益严重的公众信任缺陷。它们于是以与全球专家和活动人士合作，推展它们所称的互联网管理和政策制订的“多方利益相关者模式”。

在这种模式下，企业和“公民社会”团体公平地与政府躺在一起，就互联网的未来作出决策。China and Russia lead the camp asserting the sovereignty of governments. Both have made clear that using the internet to organise political opposition is a threat to “national security”. China’s internet is in effect an “intranet” that connects with the global system only at controlled choke points. Iran is working to build a “halal” or “pure” internet. President Vladimir Putin’s Russia is moving in a similar direction.中国和俄罗斯是坚决政府主权阵营的领头者。

两国都具体回应，利用互联网的组织政治赞成活动是对“国家安全性”的一种威胁。中国的互联网实质上是一种“内联网”，只是在可控的网络枢纽点与全球系统连接。伊朗于是以致力于建设一个“清真”的互联网。

弗拉基米尔普京(Vladimir Putin)主政的俄罗斯于是以朝着类似于的方向行进。If the “free and open” camp cannot do better to align words and deeds, it will lose. Further damaging revelations will emerge as long as people have reason to suspect their rights to privacy and freedom of expression are being violated.如果“权利和对外开放”阵营无法更佳做言行一致，那么他们将告终。只要人们有理由猜测自己的隐私权和言论自由于是以遭侵害，就不会喷出更加多具备破坏力的爆料。For companies, the first step is to make public commitments to respect users’ rights, then implement those commitments in a transparent, accountable and independently verifiable manner. A grouping of democracies including the US and the UK, known as the Freedom Online Coalition, should implement policies that support a free and open global internet. These encompass greater transparency about surveillance practices, with genuinely “effective domestic oversight”.对于企业而言，第一步应该是公开发表允诺认同用户权利，接下来是以一种半透明、可问责和可独立国家核实的方式实施这些允诺。

还包括美国和英国在内的民主国家联盟（被称作权利在线联盟(Freedom Online Coalition)）应该实行反对权利且对外开放的全球互联网的政策。这些政策还包括利用确实“有效地的国内监督”，提升监听实践中的透明度。

Democracies’ pursuit of short-term political interests can contribute to fragmentation. Take Europe’s recent “right to be forgotten” ruling allowing citizens to request sensitive information be omitted from search results. Activists from Egypt to Hong Kong fear copycat steps in their countries will strengthen barriers to global information flows.民主国家对短期政治利益的追赶有可能激化混杂。以欧洲最近的“被消逝权”判决为事例，该判决容许公民拒绝将脆弱信息从搜寻结果中移除。

从埃及到香港，活动人士担忧各自的国家效仿此举，从而增大全球信息流动的妨碍。If even democracies cannot be trusted as stewards of an open internet, the power of all governments must be kept in check by companies and civil society through processes based in a common commitment to keep cyber space free and interconnected.如果就连民主国家也无法被信赖为对外开放互联网的守护者，那么企业和公民社会必需通过基于维持网络空间权利且互联互通的联合允诺的过程，约束所有政府的权力。But if companies are to win civil society over to their side, activists must be able to trust them not to violate their privacy or restrict speech. Strengthening trust in public and private institutions that shape the internet should be a priority for anyone with an interest – commercial, moral or personal – in keeping global networks open and free.然而，如果企业要将公民社会谋求到他们这边来，活动人士必需需要坚信企业会侵害他们的隐私，也会容许言论。

强化对塑造成互联网的公共和私营机构的信任，不应沦为无意（无论是出于商业、道德还是个人利益）维持全球互联网对外开放和权利的任何人的优先事项。

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